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Justitia-our icon of justice. She sits or stands above courthouses or in
courtrooms, supposedly overseeing and inspiring choices between right
and wrong. And we trust in her competence-until we are confronted
with a body of law such as sex discrimination law, in which so much
seems unjust. Thus, we approach her. Is she really what she seems?
At first glance, we are reassured-Justice is, after all, a woman. She
must understand us. Yet why is she female, given the Supreme Court's
conclusion-and the evidence in society-that "God designed the sexes to
occupy different spheres of action and that it belonged to men to make,
apply, and execute the laws?"' If Justice is a woman, surely this fact
should argue for women's inclusion in the sphere of law.
But, as we again look at our icon, a troubling reality confronts us: Jus-
tice is not simply a woman, she is a blindfolded woman. Why this blind-
fold? The standard assumption among legal scholars is that Justice herself
tied it. But if we accept this explanation, we must wonder why Justice
chooses to separate and distance herself. Does she not consider the circum-
stances of a dispute important to its resolution? Is the ethos of concern for
the individual, which is a crucial element in today's feminist visions of a
legal system, an approach that Justice considers inappropriate? Perhaps
Justice is not a feminist.
Or perhaps Justice did not choose to be blindfolded. In such a
case-where Justice was blindfolded by someone else-our suspicion that
Justice has been "similarly situated" appears verified. Blindfolded, Justice
cannot see that she is a woman; not realizing that she is different from
men, she is deprived of all the advantages and disadvantages such recogni-
tion would bring.
It may be true, as many have observed, that the blindfold ensures Jus-
tice's impartiality towards those with more power and influence than she.
But at the same time, the blindfold ensures Justice's impartiality towards
those with less power, those who are, in some sense, disadvantaged. Una-
ble to see whatever systemic disadvantages this latter group faces, unable
to see her own membership in such a group and thereby possibly under-
stand the nature of their plight, Justice can make her decisions based only
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on a limited set of facts before her. The blindfold guarantees not only that
Justice will be similarly situated, but that she will apply the similarly
situated doctrine to all she does. It is placed upon her to guarantee her
adherence to a status quo predetermined by the Pygmalions who personi-
fied her.
We may hope that Justice, though blindfolded, realizes her gender
through non-visual means. From a feminist standpoint, the blindfold may
even have served some positive purpose, in heightening Justice's other
senses, allowing her to "see" what may not always be visible. But the time
has come fully to restore Justice to all her senses. It is time Justice em-
ployed all of her powers in overseeing the law. It is time she cast off her
blindfold.
